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ABSTRACT
During the 1990s US healthcare markets underwent a significant transformation. Managed care rose
to  become  the  dominant  form  of  insurance  in  the  private  sector.  Also,  a  wave  of  hospital
consolidation occurred. In 1990, the mean population-weighted hospital Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) in a Health Services Area (HSA) was .19. By 2000, the HHI had risen to .26. This paper
explores whether the rise in managed care caused the increase in hospital concentration. We use an
instrumental variables approach with 10-year differences to identify the relationship between
managed care penetration and hospital consolidation. Our results strongly imply that the rise of
managed care did not cause the hospital consolidation wave. This finding is robust to a number of
different specifications.
Robert Town
School of Public Health
University of Minnesota
Mayo Mail Code 729














During the 1990s the landscape of US healthcare markets underwent a dramatic 
transformation. Managed care in one of its many forms displaced indemnity insurance to 
become the dominant form of insurance in the private sector (Glied, 2001). Over the 
same period, a wave of hospital mergers, acquisitions and hospital system expansions 
occurred. In 1990, the mean, population weighted, hospital Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) in a Health Services Area (HSA) was .1903. By 2000, the HHI had risen to .2566.
1 
The HHI measures the level of ‘competition’ in a market with 0 being perfect 
competition and 1 being pure monopoly.  
Understanding the determinants of hospital concentration allows the development 
of policies to manage hospital competition. Hospital market power impacts the 
functioning of health care markets in several important ways. First, as hospitals garner 
more market power, their bargaining position with payers may improve and that can 
increase the cost of hospital care for the privately-insured population. Research shows 
that increases in hospital concentration lead to higher hospital prices (Gaynor and Vogt, 
2001, and Dranove and Saitherwaitte, 2001, provide excellent reviews of this literature). 
Increased hospital market power is also associated with decreased hospital quality 
(Kessler and McClellan, 2002; and Gowrisankaran and Town, 2003). Finally, there is 
some evidence that decreases in hospital competition decrease access to health services 
for underserved populations (Aizer, Currie and Morretti, 2004).  
 
                                                 
1 The unweighted HHI is .31 in 1990 and .37 in 2000. 
1 It is conventional wisdom that the rise of managed care precipitated the hospital 
consolidations and concentration in the 1990s.
2 Graphical analysis is consistent with the 
conventional wisdom. Figure 1 graphs the annual mean population-weighted levels of 
hospital HHI and HMO penetration across HSAs.
3 Two hospital HHI measures are 
graphed, overall concentration and concentration due to changes in hospital ownership 
structure (i.e. mergers, acquisitions and hospital system formation and expansion).
4 
Several features of this graph are noteworthy. First, hospital concentration and HMO 
penetration share a common trend throughout most of the 1990s. Only in the late 1990s 
was there a break in this trend, as HMO penetration experienced a slight decline while 
hospital concentration continued to increase. While this correlation is suggestive, it does 
not prove that there is a causal link between HMO penetration and hospital concentration. 
The second noteworthy feature of Figure 1 is that most of the increase in hospital 
concentration occurred in the mid-1990s. Finally, of the .063 overall increase in the 
population weighted HHI, .053 is due to mergers, acquisitions or hospital system 
expansion. The remaining .01 change in HHI is a consequence of hospital exits and 
changes in the distribution of beds across hospitals.  
This paper tests the proposition that the rise of managed care caused hospitals to 
consolidate in the 1990s. Our models explicitly account for the possibility that markets 
are systematically heterogeneous and that this heterogeneity may bias cross-sectional 
estimates of the parameters of interest. We also use an instrumental variables (IV) 
                                                 
2 For example, Evans Cuellar and Gertler (2005) say, “Hospital consolidation is likely a response to 
managed care,.” (p.214). Also, see Dranove, Simon and White (2002), Employee Benefit Research Institute 
(1999), Czajkowski (1999), Grembowski et al. (2002), McCue et al. (1999) and Hollis (1997). 
3 Our measure of hospital concentration includes direct ownership of hospital assets as well as membership 
in a hospital system.  
4 The exact calculation of the latter measure is discussed in the Methods section. 
2 approach to account for the possibility that managed care penetration may be 
endogenous.  
Our estimates indicate that the rise in managed care did not cause the increase in 
hospital concentration. In every specification we estimated, the coefficient of managed 
care penetration is negative and in many of the specifications it is significant. That is, if 
anything, our estimates indicate that the rise of HMOs reduced hospital concentration. 
The next section discusses some of the reasons why managed care might lead to 
hospital consolidation and reviews the relevant literature. The following sections present 
the methods, the data, the results and the discussion of our findings.  
Hospital Consolidation and Managed Care 
Why Managed Care May Cause Hospital Consolidation 
There is a widespread belief that the wave of hospital consolidation that occurred 
over the 1990s was driven by the rise of managed care. There are at least three reasons 
why this might be so. First, managed care may reduce the demand for hospital beds thus 
creating excess capacity in the market. Second, managed care may change the bargaining 
power of hospitals relative to health insurers. Third, the value of contracting with an 
integrated hospital system may be greater for managed care organizations than indemnity 
insurers.  
One of the theories underlying managed care is that by monitoring and controlling 
health care use, insurers can reduce health care expenditures and perhaps increase 
enrollee health. In the RAND health insurance experiment, enrollment in the prepaid 
Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound reduced the likelihood of a hospital admission 
3 by 35% compared with a fee-for-service population (Manning et al., 1987).
5 However, as 
an explanation of hospital consolidation this finding needs embellishment. Most 
economic models of mergers predict that the incentive to merge increases with the 
demand for the product (e.g. Deneckere and Davidson, 1985). The intuition behind this 
result is straightforward—the larger the market the larger the profit gains from market 
power. 
However, it is possible to conceive of circumstances in which a decline in demand 
for inpatient services leads to hospital consolidation. If demand falls far enough so the 
market can no longer support the old number of hospitals under the old ownership 
structure, then there may be an incentive to merge. According to neo-classical economic 
theory, if the reduction in demand leads to lower prices and if price falls below average 
variable cost, the market will need to remove the capacity in some way. Hospital closure 
is one way to reduce capacity. However, hospital assets have “high specificity” and few 
alternative uses. These features of the hospital market may drive hospitals to seek to 
combine operations in order to gain market power and thereby raise price above average 
cost. These combinations may also allow hospitals to achieve efficiencies and reduce 
average costs, thereby keeping price above average costs. Hospitals may prefer to merge 
and perhaps lose valued autonomy rather than close. This explanation requires that 
hospitals value autonomy as well as profits. This is a plausible assumption given the 
hospital industry’s historical basis as a decentralized, community-based system. If 
autonomy was not valued, the hospitals would have been better off by merging earlier. 
Another motivation for consolidation is that merging hospitals may wish to internalize 
                                                 
5 While managed care may reduce demand, the advancement of medicine has surely had a larger effect on 
the demand for inpatient days. According to our estimates, from 1990 to 2000 average inpatient days per-
capita declined by 54%. 
4 externalities. In the face of excess capacity hospitals may want to reduce capacity by 
closing down wings or converting parts of their hospital to an outpatient or skilled 
nursing facility. But, there may be an externality problem. If a hospital reduces the 
number of beds, then all hospitals in the market may benefit. A merger or hospital system 
expansion may allow hospitals partially to internalize that externality.  
The second reason that increases in managed care might trigger hospital 
consolidation is based on the ability of managed care organizations (MCOs) to bargain 
effectively with hospitals over prices. The rise of managed care may change the price 
elasticity of demand for hospital services. By selective contracting, MCOs increase their 
bargaining leverage with hospitals vis-à-vis indemnity plans. However, in economic 
theory the effect of increasing the price elasticity of demand on the incentive to 
consolidate is ambiguous. Mergers in markets with intermediate levels of price elasticity 
are more likely to increase market power than those in markets with either low or high 
elasticity. Thus, the common belief that changes in bargaining power between payers and 
hospitals increase the incentive to merge is not necessarily true.   
The third possible reason why managed care may increase the incentive for 
hospitals to consolidate is that by forming an integrated delivery system the hospitals are 
better able to manage patient care (Shortell, et al., 1996). This ability to better manage 
patient care may make the organization better able to engage in capitation arrangements 
with health plans. The formation of these integrated delivery systems requires hospitals to 
form both vertical (with physician groups) and horizontal (with other hospitals) 
arrangements so that they can manage care for a geographically dispersed population. 
That is, in order for the managed care organizations to achieve efficiencies they need to 
5 write ‘high-powered’ contracts and hospitals need to integrate to be able to respond 
effectively to the incentives contained in these contracts. The development of integrated 
delivery systems is a weak explanation for the link between managed care and hospital 
consolidation. Capitated hospital arrangements never became widespread and integrated 
delivery systems ultimately “didn’t work.” (Burns and Pauly, 2002).  
Empirical Evidence 
  There are two studies of the relationship between managed care penetration and 
hospital market competition. Dranove, Simon and White (2002) (herafter, DSW) use data 
on physicians’ reports of managed care revenue and find that the change in hospital 
concentration in 68 large MSAs between 1981 and 1994 is positively correlated with the 
level of managed care concentration in 1993/1994. This research has some limitations. 
First, the time period of the analysis is only of modest interest because most of the 
hospital consolidations and most of the increase in managed care in the 1990s occurred 
after 1994. Much of the variation in the variables of interest is missing. Second, DSW 
focus on large metropolitan areas in which hospital mergers are much less likely to lead 
to significant increases in market power. The mean end-of-period Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index they report is .126 – well below concentration levels that would give the Federal 
Trade Commission or the Department of Justice cause for concern.
6 Third, the measure of 
managed care penetration is the mean percent of physician practice revenues from 
managed care. This measure of managed care penetration, based on the physician 
services factor markets, is not widely used in research. It is also a function of physician 
prices in a location and thus may be more subject to endogeneity problems than simple 
                                                 
6 It is also likely that antitrust markets are much smaller than the large MSAs and thus they likely have 
significant measurement error.  
6 managed care penetration rates. However, a potential advantage of DSW’s measure is 
that it includes all forms of managed care, not just HMOs. The more commonly used 
measure is penetration based on the managed care product market.
7 Fourth, DSW regress 
the change in concentration on the end-of-period level of managed care penetration. They 
argue that this is a reasonable approach because managed care penetration in most cites 
was close to zero at the beginning of their sample. However, in this type of statistical 
analysis, the difference between being ‘close’ to zero and being exactly zero matters. In 
this circumstance, failure to difference a variable, even if it is close to but different from 
zero, can still lead to significant biases.
8 According to InterStudy data, 62% of MSAs 
with over 800,000 population (roughly DSW’s sample) had managed care penetration 
greater than 5% in 1985 and 37% had HMO penetration greater than 5% in 1981.
9 We 
replicate and discuss the DSW results in greater detail in the Results section.  
  Chernew (1995) analyzes the relationship between the change in the number of 
hospitals and managed care penetration in 175 large MSAs between 1982 and 1987. He 
finds a negative and significant relationship between managed care penetration and the 
number of hospitals in an MSA. Like DSW, Chernew’s analysis occurs before the rise in 
managed care. Also, Chernew’s analysis does not explicitly focus on changes in market 
                                                 
e
7 For example, Baker and Brown (1999) use HMO penetration data from Group Health Association of 
America as a measure of managed care penetration. 
8 We performed the following Monte Carlo simulation. The base model is .5 it i it it yx α = ++ for t=1,2. 
The variables 
i α , x1 and x2 are drawn from uniform distributions (with censoring) with a mean of .2, .035 
and .2, respectively. About half of the x1’s are equal to zero. The  are drawn from a N(0,.1). The x’s are 
correlated with
it e
i α  ( .5 ρ = ). We performed 500 simulations each with 70 observations. Estimation of the 
coefficient on x using the approach of DSW resulted in a bias of approximately 50%. 
9 The PMSA with over 5% HMO penetration in 1981 include: Denver, CO; Portland, OR; Orange County, 
CA; Seattle, WA; New York, NY; Rochester, NY; Minneapolis, MN; Sacramento, CA; Los Angeles, CA; 
Miami, FL; Milwaukee, WI; Riverside Co., CA; San Diego, CA; Phoenix, AZ; Washington, DC and San 
Francisco, CA. DSW exclude Washington, DC, three California PMSAs, and Minneapolis from one of 
their analyses to test the robustness of their conclusions. 
7 structure due to consolidation. The number of hospital competitors in a market can 
change due to consolidation (although a consolidation does not necessarily change the 
physical number of hospitals in a location) or because of entry or exit.   
In related work, Baker and Brown (1999) examine the impact of managed care on 
the number of mammography providers. Their data is cross-sectional and they instrument 
for managed care penetration using the size distribution of employers in the locale. They 
find that managed care penetration reduces the number of mammography providers.  
Methods 
  Our approach to estimate the impact of managed care on hospital consolidation is 
to relate the change in HMO penetration to one of several possible measures of the 
change in hospital concentration in a market area. Our empirical model is:  
(1)   .     Hit =αi + HMOitβt + xit
'γ t + eit
Hospital concentration in market i at time t, Hit, is a linear function of HMO penetration, 
HMOit, market characteristics, xit, a time-invariant unobserved (to the researcher) market 
fixed effect, i α , and a market/time shock, eit. We let  t β  depend on time as changes in 
technology or unmeasured market conditions may affect the incentive for hospitals to 
consolidate in response to managed care. 
It is possible and perhaps probable that the unobserved market fixed effect is 
correlated with HMO penetration. There are many possible reasons for this correlation. 
For example, locations in which hospitals have highα ’s may be unattractive for HMOs 
to enter because they have fewer hospitals with which to contract. If α  is correlated with 
HMO penetration, OLS estimation of (1) will lead to biased estimates of t β . This bias can 
be eliminated by taking differences of (1) across time.  





it it t it it t it t H HMO HMO x x u ββ γ γ −− ∆= ∆ + + ∆ + +  
where   is the standard difference operator (i.e.  ∆ 1 it it it HHH − ∆ ≡−  ),  1
e
tt β ββ − =− , 
1
e
tt γ γγ − =−  and  . One may still be concerned that the error term in (2), u 1 it it it uee − =− t, 
may be correlated with our HMO variables. Our strategy is to correct this possible 
endogeneity by estimating the parameters of (2) with an instrumental variable approach. 
We discuss the instrument set later in this section. 
  We use a long difference of 10 years to define our change variable, with 1990 as 
the base year.
10 We chose 1990 as the starting year because that is the approximate 
beginning of the horizontal (within market) consolidation wave. The mean, population-
weighted HHI in 1985 was .1900 and in 1990 it was .1903 – a very small difference over 
the five year period. However, the increase in average HHI between 1990 and 1991, the 
years of the smallest increase in our sample, was .0022, a rate of increase that is 55 times 
larger than the annual rate of increase over the preceding five years. 
Measures of the Change in Concentration 
  The most common measure of competition used by economists is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). This measure serves as the basis for two of the three measures 
of the change in concentration in our analysis. The other measure of the change in 
hospital concentration that we study is the number of mergers between hospitals in the 
geographic area. 
                                                 
10 We have performed our analysis on both a longer period, 1985 to 2000, and a shorter period, 1992-1998. 
The results from those analyses are qualitatively identical to those we present here. These results are 
available from the authors upon request.  
9   The HHI is simply the sum of the squared market shares of all firms in a given 






















 and q is 
a measure of output/capacity while N is the number of market participants.  
We made two important decisions in calculating the HHI. The first decision 
concerns the boundaries (both geographic and product) of the market. As we discuss in 
the data section, we use a Health Services Area (HSA) as the geographic boundary and 
short-term, non-governmental inpatient care as the product market. The second decision 
concerns the appropriate measure of output. Our measure of output is the total number of 
staffed beds. We tested the sensitivity of our results to these design decisions by 
repeating our analysis using HHI constructed from alternative measures of the geographic 
market (MSAs) and output (inpatient days) and found that our conclusions are robust to 
these alternatives.
11
  The standard HHI can change from period to period within a market for several 
reasons. The most obvious one is a merger or system formation between two market 
participants. However, this is not the only reason that the HHI can change. The HHI will 
change if the distribution of output/capacity changes or if there is entry into or exit from 
the market. If managed care does have an impact on the HHI through causing mergers we 
                                                 
11 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
10 would like to isolate the change in the HHI due to mergers. So, we developed a measure 
of the change in HHI due to consolidation (∆MHHI). 
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where   is the share based on the distribution of output/capacity from period r 
aggregated to the hospital using the ownership/system structure in period t (r<t). If there 
is only one change in ownership/system structure in a location (denote the hospitals as j 
and k) during the period then the
2 () ti r sO
, 2 it r jr kr MHHI s s ∆ = . For the most part, ∆MHHI will be 
either 0 (if no changes in within-location ownership/system structures occur) or positive 
(if there is a consolidation in a location). If a de-merger occurs then ∆MHHI is negative. 
  Our third measure of the change in hospital concentration is simply an indicator 
taking the value of 1 if a merger occurred between hospitals in an HSA and 0 otherwise. 
In essence, this is simply an indicator of whether ∆MHHI is greater than zero. We 
include this variable in our set of dependent variables because ∆MHHI is a nonlinear 
function of market shares and the resulting distribution is highly skewed as well as 
censored. A high degree of skewness in the distribution of a left-hand side variable can 
lead to misleading inferences because of the presence of outliers – thus analyzing the 
parameter estimates from the indicator allows us to examine the robustness of our 
estimates from the ∆MHHI regression.  
11 Instruments 
  The possibility that the error term in (2) may be correlated with our measures of 
HMO penetration caused us to seek out potential instruments for HMO penetration. 
There are two possible reasons for this correlation: omitted variable bias (primarily health 
status) and unobserved characteristics of hospital markets that may influence HMO 
penetration.  
We use as instruments the number of potential HMO entrants in a market in 1990, 
the number of non-specialist physicians per capita in 1990, the percent of the population 
that is self-employed and the percent of the population employed in firms with over a 100 
employees in 1990. These variables are plausibly unrelated to changes in hospital market 
structure and they predict HMO penetration. 
The number of potential HMO entrants is simply the number of HMOs that are 
participating in a market within the state in 1990 but have yet to enter into the HSA in 
question. The rationale behind this measure is that an HMO must meet a number of state-
level regulatory hurdles before it can enter a market, and if an HMO is already 
participating in a state, then its entry costs will be lower than if it tries to enter a market 
without any previous experience in that state. Our hypothesis is that more potential HMO 
entrants will increase actual entry in a market and that HMO penetration will be higher.  
We hypothesize that HMOs will have more bargaining power and consequently 
lower costs of doing business in markets with higher numbers of primary care physicians 
per capita. Baker and Brown (1999) used the size distribution of employers to instrument 
for HMO penetration in their analysis of the impact of managed care on mammography 
providers.  
12 It is well known that if the instrument set is a poor predictor of the endogenous 
variables conditional on all of the control variables, then small-sample bias can be very 
large (Stock and Staiger, 1997). Following the suggestion of Stock and Staiger (1997) 
and Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995), we performed F-tests of the joint significance of the 
instrument set for the endogenous variables, ∆HMO Penetration and HMO Penetration. 
The F-statistics are 3.36 and 6.29 for the regressions with corresponding p-values of .003 
and <.0001, respectively. Both of these F-statistics are significantly greater than 1—a 
value that Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) suggest should be “a cause for concern.”
12  
Estimation Strategy 
  We have three different dependent variables – ∆HHI, ∆MHHI, and the merger 
indicator. Only ∆HHI has a distribution that is appropriate for using linear methods. The 
distribution of ∆MHHI is essentially censored with two-thirds of the observations equal 
to zero. Of course, the distribution of the merger indicator is discrete. 
  For each dependent variable we estimate two regressions – one treating the HMO 
penetration variables as exogenous and one instrumental variable regression. For ∆HHI 
we use linear regression with heteroskedasticity correction and instrumental variable 
estimation. As the distribution of ∆MHHI is essentially censored, we estimate the 
parameters using standard Tobit and instrumental Tobit as described by Newy (1989). 
Finally, we use Probit and instrumental variable Probit approaches to estimate the 
parameters from the merger indicator regression.  
                                                 
12 The F-test suggests that the small sample bias will be less than .30. The presence of this bias will not 
overturn any of our conclusions.  
13 Data 
  An observation in our analysis is a Health Services Area (HSA), defined by the 
National Center for Health Statistics (Makuc, et al., 1991) as one or more counties that 
are relatively self-contained with respect to the provision of routine hospital care. This 
definition is operationalized by using an algorithm that groups counties by minimizing 
travel by patients within the area to areas outside of the defined group. Thus, unlike 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), the HSA relies on patient flows instead of geo-
political boundaries to identify hospital ‘markets.’
13
This definition is not ideal. The ideal unit of observation for our study would be 
an antitrust market. However, defining antitrust markets is notoriously difficult. It 
requires detailed analysis of each hospital under consideration, and there is still 
substantial disagreement within the economic and legal communities on the appropriate 
methodology to use (Capps et al., 2002; Werden, 1990). While it is important to 
recognize that HSAs are not antitrust markets, they are probably closer approximation to 
them than MSAs. Most economists believe that antitrust markets typically are smaller 
than MSAs, and HSAs, on average, are significantly smaller than MSAs.  
The data in this study come from several sources. Data on hospitals come from 
the American Hospital Association (AHA) hospital survey. This commonly-used data set 
contains information on hospital location, size (beds and inpatient days) and system 
membership. The AHA survey also tracks mergers and acquisition of different hospitals 
in an appendix to the documentation. In most of the analysis, we use data from 1990 to 
                                                 
13 A literature in antitrust analysis suggests that using patient flows to define markets can be misleading 
(Werden, 1990, and Capps et al., 2002). However, it is probably the case that using patient flow data to 
identify markets is more accurate than using existing geo-political boundaries.  
14 2000 but some of our sensitivity analyses go back to the 1985 hospital survey. Each 
hospital is assigned to an HSA according to its address in the 1990 AHA Survey.  
  Our information on the structure of the managed care market comes from 
InterStudy. InterStudy collects information on the number of HMO enrollees by health 
plan. The HMO data come from InterStudy census data (InterStudy, 1985-1987; InterStudy, 
1988-2001) and Group Health Association HMO Directories (Group Health Association of 
America, 1989-1992). The InterStudy Census includes HMO location, founding year, model 
type, not-for-profit status, federal qualification, and national affiliation. Enrollment by 
geographic area comes from multiple sources. From 1985 to 1988, enrollment data comes 
from the InterStudy Census and supplemental InterStudy reports on areas served by HMOs 
(Hartwell, et al. 1986). From 1988 to 1991, the list of counties an HMO operates in was 
obtained from Group Health Association HMO Directories (Group Health Association of 
America, 1989-1992). From 1992 to 1996, the list of counties where each HMO operates 
and enrollment by MSA was obtained from 1992 through 1996. Following 1996, InterStudy 
obtained county-level information on most HMOs in its annual survey and provided country 
enrollment measures. Where county enrollments were unavailable, enrollment for each 
HMO was pro-rated on the basis of county population to the each county served by the 
HMO.  
  There is a significant change in enrollment distribution between 1987 and 1988 
because of the significant improvement in the listing of counties served. Because of the less 
complete listing of counties served in 1985 to 1987, MSA enrollment may be overstated. 
But, pro-rating HMO enrollment on the basis of a larger list of counties served may 
overstate rural country enrollment if HMOs predominantly developed in urban areas and 
15 then expanded to adjacent rural areas. Since HMO development was more of an urban than 
rural phenomena in the mid- to late- 1980s, the 1985 enrollment measures probably reflect 
HMO development reasonably well.    
  County level market measures come from the Area Resource File (Bureau of Health 
Professions, 1999). State level wage data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Occupational Employment Statistics (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2001). State HMO 
regulations come from reports compiled by Aspen Publishers (Aspen System Corporation 
1985-1994; Aspen System Corporation 1988-1994; Aspen Systems Corporation 1996; Levy 
1999). 
  Health System Areas (HSA) measures were constructed by first measuring HMO 
enrollment, Area Resource File characteristics, and wage data at the county level. Then, 
HSA-level measures were constructed as weighted averages of all counties in the HSA, with 
the weights being the proportions of the HSA’s total HMO enrollment in each county.  
County data were aggregated into HSAs using a crosswalk between counties and HSAs.  
  We supplement the hospital and HMO information with data from the Area 
Resource File (ARF). For each year, the ARF has information on the number of primary 
care physicians, median per-capita income, unemployment rate, population of the HSA, 
and percent of the population over 65 years of age. We also acquired information on state 
hospital certificate of need (CON) regulations from the American Health Planning 
Association. 
We limit our sample to HSAs with a population of more than 50,000 and more 
than one hospital 1990. We dropped the monopoly HSAs as those areas, by definition, 
16 cannot experience a horizontal consolidation (unless there is entry and then 
merger/system formation – a very unlikely possibility).
14  
Table 1 lists the dependent and explanatory variables as well as the instruments in 
the analysis and the un-weighted means and standard deviations of these variables. 
Histograms of the ∆HHI and ∆MHHI are graphed in Figures 2a and 2b, respectively. The 
distribution of ∆HHI looks roughly symmetric while the distribution of ∆MHHI is 
essentially censored at zero.  
Several patterns in Table 1 are noteworthy. As mentioned earlier, we see a large 
increase in hospital concentration and HMO penetration during the 1990s. Approximately 
40% of all HSAs experienced a horizontal hospital merger. We also observe large 
declines in inpatient days per capita (20%) and the number of beds per capita (17%) over 
this 10-year period. In some ancillary analysis we have performed, the decline in 
inpatient days and beds per capita appears unrelated to HMO penetration.
15    
Results 
Figure 3 graphs the number of horizontal hospital mergers, acquisitions and 
system expansions, total number (both horizontal and across HSAs) of hospital mergers, 
acquisitions and system expansions, and the number of hospital failures over time for our 
sample HSAs. Several features of the graph are of interest. First, in the early 1990s there 
was an increase in both the number of horizontal ownership changes and across-market 
ownership changes with the peak occurring in the mid-1990s. The height of the 
merger/system activity occurred two years before the peak of HMO penetration. Second, 
                                                 
14 In order to check the robustness of our findings, we have also performed the analysis limiting the sample 
to those HSAs with less than 11 hospitals. Again, the qualitative results using this sample are identical to 
those we present here. These results are available from the authors upon request. 
15 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
17 horizontal ownership changes account for approximately 40% of all ownership changes. 
Third, there is a modest inverse relationship between the number of hospital 
consolidations and the number of hospital failures.  
Tables 2, 3 and 4 presents two sets of coefficient results for the three dependent 
variables--∆HHI, ∆MHHI and the market consolidation indicator, respectively. For each 
dependent variable the first set of results presents the coefficient estimates treating HMO 
penetration as exogenous. The second set of results is the instrumental variable 
coefficient estimates. For each estimation method we present estimates from two 
specifications. The first set of coefficient estimates is from a specification that includes 
both the change in HMO penetration and the level of HMO penetration in 1990 as well as 
all of the control variables. The second set of estimates is from a specification that 
includes just the change in HMO penetration and all of the control variables. This 
specification tests the sensitivity of the results by imposing the restriction that β is time-
invariant.  
Table 2 presents the coefficient estimates The OLS estimated coefficient on 
∆HMO Penetration is negative, small in magnitude and insignificant at traditional levels 
of confidence in both columns (1) and (2) of Table 2. That is, an increase in HMO 
penetration is associated with a decrease in measured hospital competition. In column (1) 
the coefficient on the level of HMO penetration in 1990 is small, positive and imprecisely 
estimated. The coefficient estimates are very similar between column (1) and (2) and the 
likelihood ratio and t-test do not reject the hypothesis that β is time invariant.  
The IV estimates of the HMO penetration coefficients are also negative and larger 
in magnitude. The coefficient on ∆HMO Penetration in both columns (3) and (4) are just 
18 significant at the 5% level. That is, there appears to be an inverse relationship between 
hospital concentration and HMO penetration. The coefficient on HMO Penetration in 
1990 in column (3) is positive but insignificant. The IV estimates do not suggest that β 
varies over time. 
  Table 3 presents the coefficient estimates with ∆MHHI as the dependent variable. 
As ∆MHHI is censored, we estimate the parameters using Tobit and IV-Tobit procedures. 
Columns (1) and (2) present the maximum likelihood Tobit estimates. The coefficients on 
∆HMO Penetration in both regressions are negative, small in magnitude and insignificant 
at traditional levels of confidence. The coefficient on HMO Penetration in 1990 is 
positive, small in magnitude and insignificant.  
The IV estimates are presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3. The coefficient 
estimates on ∆HMO Penetration are again negative, large in magnitude and flirt with 
significance at the 5% level of confidence. That is, there is modest evidence that an 
increase in HMO penetration actually reduced consolidation activity. The coefficient on 
HMO Penetration in column (3) is positive and is imprecisely estimated.  
Table 4 presents the coefficient results with the consolidation indicator as the 
dependent variable. The pattern of the coefficients is similar in the Probit and IV-Probit 
regressions. The coefficient on ∆HMO Penetration is negative and insignificant in all 
four regressions. The coefficient on HMO Penetration is positive and insignificant in 
columns (1) and (3). These results in combination with the results in Table 3 suggest that 
an increase in HMO penetration did not affect the likelihood of a consolidation but, 
19 conditional on a consolidation occurring, reduced the average size of the consolidating 
parties.
16  
  While the rise in HMO penetration does not seem to explain hospital 
consolidation, the presence of excess capacity is strongly correlated with hospital 
consolidation due to merger. The t-statistics on Hospitals Per Capita range from 2.60 to 
4.39 in the ∆MHHI and hospital consolidation indicator regression. A one standard 
deviation increase in beds per capita (1.84) is associated with a non-trivial .048 increase 
in hospital concentration due to consolidation.  
Several other variables are significantly associated with consolidation activity. 
The parameter estimates in all four regressions indicated that increases in the percent of 
the population in poverty and increases in the population level in 1990 are associated 
with increases in consolidation activity. Finally, an increase in the proportion of hospitals 
that are for-profit is associated with an increased likelihood of a consolidation.    
Robustness 
We estimated the parameters using different time frames (1990 to 1995, 1995 to 
2000, and 1990 to 1998). The parameter estimates from these regressions lead to the 
same conclusions as those presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4. We also estimated the 
parameters on several different samples that were split by initial population size (split at 
500,000 and 800,000) and HMO penetration (split at 5% and 10%) and again we found 
no significant relationship between HMO penetration and hospital consolidations in any 
of those samples. Finally, we also estimated the parameters weighting the observations by 
                                                 
16 Two-stage estimation supports this conclusion.  
20 the HSA population and the implications of the coefficients are not meaningfully 
different. 
Explaining the Difference between Our Estimates and DSW 
There are several possible reasons why our results differ from DSW. First, we 
difference both our left-hand and right-hand variables of interest while DSW do not 
difference their measure of HMO penetration. Second, DSW use a more inclusive 
measure of managed care but one that may have more measurement error. Third, they 
examine a different time frame, 1981 to 1994. Fourth, they use the MSA as the unit of 
analysis. Fifth, they limit their analysis to the largest 68 MSAs with population over 
800,000.  
In order to determine the source of our differing conclusions we first attempt to 
replicate their results with our data. We use the largest 68 MSAs and data from 1985 to 
1994. We assumed that the final observed penetration level as a measure of penetration, 
assuming that initial penetration was zero. We use a similar, but not identical, set of 
control variables and instruments.
17  
Table A2 in the appendix presents the results of our attempts to replicate DSW. In 
column (1) we present the coefficient estimates of this effort. As in DSW, the coefficient 
on managed care penetration is positive and significant. In column (2) we estimate the 
same equation but replace the level of managed care penetration with the change in the 
managed care penetration. The coefficient on the managed care variable declines and 
becomes insignificant. However, the power of the instruments declines substantially 
raising the possibility of small sample bias. Nevertheless, inferences regarding the impact 
                                                 
17 DSW use the percent of workforce self-employed and percentage of workforce employed in large firms 
in 1992 as instruments. We use the percentage of firms in each size category in 1992 and 1985 as 
instruments. 
21 of managed care on hospital concentration are sensitive to the decision to difference the 
variable of interest. 
In columns (3) and (4) of Table A2 we estimate the parameters as in columns (1) 
and (2) on the same sample, but using OLS. The parameter estimates in column (3) are 
very close to the estimates in column (1). However, the OLS estimates of the impact of 
the differenced managed care variable are essentially zero. In the last two columns of 
Table A2, we estimate the same specification as in the first two columns but use a more 
inclusive sample selection rule. We include all MSAs with a population greater than 
500,000. Both coefficients on managed care population are insignificant in this sample.  
Our estimates suggest that the results in DSW are sensitive to the decisions not to 
difference the managed care variable, the sample selection criteria and the time period 
they studied. While these findings are very suggestive, they are not conclusive as the data 
we use are not identical to DSW. 
Discussion 
  In 1996, the two hospitals in Great Falls, MT, merged to form a “monopoly” 
hospital.
18 According to the State of Montana’s Bureau of Business and Economic 
Research, “Managed care in Montana is virtually nonexistent, with recent data showing a 
miniscule number of people covered by health maintenance organizations.”
19 That is, the 
anecdotal evidence from Great Falls suggests that managed care played no role in causing 
the large increase in hospital concentration. The parties to the merger argued that there 
was not enough demand for inpatient services to support two acute care hospitals in Great 
                                                 
18 The two merging hospitals were Columbus Hospital and Montana Deaconess Medical Center.  
19 http://www.doj.state.mt.us/safety/greatfallshospital/decisionamended1996.pdf 
22 Falls.
20 The data support this contention. In 1990, Great Falls had 7.56 beds per 1,000— 
the average in our sample is 3.85. 
  At the other end of the urban spectrum is Philadelphia. The Philadelphia 
metropolitan area (five counties in southeast Pennsylvania, 3 in New Jersey and 3 in 
Delaware) contained 65 hospitals, five of which were academic medical centers and three 
of which were children’s hospitals. Philadelphia experienced a large growth in HMO 
penetration through the 1990s. In 1990, the HMO penetration was approximately 16%. 
By 2000, HMO penetration had risen to 53%. However, hospital HHI only increased a 
modest .023. 
  Furthermore, most of the increase in concentration in Philadelphia is unrelated to 
HMO penetration. The HHI increase is attributable, in large part, to the entry into the 
market by the Pittsburgh-based Allegheny Health Educational and Research Foundation 
(AHERF). AHERF acquired the poorest-performing academic medical center. AHERF’s 
entry touched off a competitive rivalry among Philadelphia’s academic medical centers to 
build bigger and bigger hospital systems. AHERF’s acquisition of one of the three 
pediatric hospitals similarly touched off intense competitive strategies by hospitals to 
develop pediatric referral networks with community hospitals and physicians. (Burns, et 
al., 1997; Burns et al., 2000).  
These two accounts of the evolution of hospital market structure from very 
different health care markets are consistent with our empirical findings. That is, the ‘lore’ 
that the hospital consolidation wave of the 1990s was caused by hospitals responding to 
the managed care revolution is not consistent with the data.  
                                                 
20 See http://www.doj.state.mt.us/safety/greatfallshospital/decisionamended1996.pdf. 
23   Our work raises an important and yet to be answered question: what really caused 
the horizontal hospital merger wave? Our results hint at a possible answer. The 
coefficient on Beds Per Capita is positive, large and significant in the all specifications in 
Table 3 and 4. This result is consistent with two possible and not mutually exclusive 
explanations. First, reduction of bed capacity is a public good (from the hospital’s 
perspective) and consolidation may help hospitals internalize this externality. Second, 
hospitals located in markets in which there is higher bed capacity likely are in worse 
financial condition than their counterparts in under-bedded areas. Mergers may be the 
best alternative to closing the facility.  
Conclusions 
It is widely believed that rise of managed care caused the hospital consolidation 
wave of the 1990s. In this study we test this proposition using data on managed care 
penetration and hospital consolidation from 1990 to 2000. Our results suggest that the 
common wisdom is false—managed care penetration is not significantly related to 
hospital consolidation. This finding is robust to different specifications, time frames and 
sample selection criteria. This finding raises an obvious question: if managed care did not 
cause hospital consolidation—what did?  
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27 Table 1 
 
Summary Statistics 
(standard deviations in parenthesis) 
Variable 1990  2000  ∆ or Percent ∆ 
Dependent Variables 




















Other Explanatory Variables 










































Percent FP Hospital in 1990  11.3% 
(17.8%) 
Hospital CON Regulation in 1990  54.8% 
(49.8) 
Land Area in 1990 (square miles)  5,928 
(47,242) 
Instruments 
Potential HMO Entrants in 1990  12.7 
(9.70) 
Primary Care Physicians per 1,000 
population in 1990 
.29 
(.094) 
Percent of Establishments smaller 
than 5 employees in 1990 
55.3% 
(3.5%) 
Percent of Establishments with 
between 5 and 9 employees in 1990 
20.6% 
(1.2%) 
Percent Population Under 65 





28 Table 2 
 
Estimates of the Impact of HMO Penetration on Change in Hospital HHI  
 (standard errors in parentheses) 
OLS IV  Variable 














HMO Penetration in 1990  .023 
(.062)  ---  .79 


























































































































































 at 5% level of confidence 
**Significant
 at 1% level of confidence. 
 
29 Table 3 
 
Estimates of the Impact of HMO Penetration on Change in Hospital Merger HHI 




IV Tobit Estimates  Variable 











HMO Penetration in 1990  .18 
(.12)  ---  1.04 








































































































































































 at 5% level of confidence 
**Significant
 at 1% level of confidence. 
30 Table 4 
 
Estimates of the Impact of HMO Penetration on the Likelihood of a Horizontal 
Consolidation 






IV Probit Estimates  Variable 










HMO Penetration in 1990  .55 
(1.00)  ---  5.68 












































































































































































 at 5% level of confidence 
**Significant
 at 1% level of confidence 
31 Figure 1 
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32 Figure 2a 
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33 Figure 3 
 


















Total Number of Hospital M&As or System Expansions
Horizontal Hospital M&A or System Expansions
Total Number of Hospital Failures
34 Appendix 
Table A1 
First Stage Regression Results 
 (standard errors in parentheses) 
Variable  ∆HMO Penetration 
HMO Penetration in 
1990 






















































































































35 Table A2 
Replication of Dranove, Simon and White (2002)—Estimating the impact of HMO 
Penetration on Hospital Concentration 1985-1994. 
 
Dependent variable is ∆Hospital HHI 
IV Estimation, MSA 
Population > 800,000 
OLS Estimation, 
MSA Population > 
800,000 
IV Estimation, MSA 
Population > 500,000 
 





(.045)  --  .099
*
(.033)  --  .060 
(.051)  -- 
∆HMO 
Penetration 
--  -.071 
(.048)  --  .0092 





































































*Significant at the 5% level. 
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